László =
Garai —
Ferenc Eros — Katalin Járó — Margit Köcski — Sándor Veres
The scientific program of the Depar=
tment
has its antecedents dating back to the 1960s. That period in Those rapid advances in society gav=
e rise
to many practical problems which, however, presupposed the answers to
theoretical questions as well: What had the social reality of the preceding=
era
been? What was the reformed society to be like? Does the direction of prog=
ress
depend on free choice or on necessity independent of man? Whether of a pragmatic, empirical,
theoretical or axiological character, the questions were not raised
separately nor were they addressed to any specific area of intellectual l=
ife:
answers to these unspoken but challenging questions, whatever their source,
were commonly — sometimes publicly — expected to be provided by the
"humanities". No su=
ch body of
integrated knowledge really existed. But within the individual disciplines=
, separately
reawakening or even reviving in the 1960s, the necessity for an integration=
of
knowledge was felt in order to cope with the questions of that period.
Moreover, the possibility for an integration of knowledge existed. As
concerns the humanities it emerged in the course of events which Lukács ca=
lled
the renaissance of Marxism. Through this process, first of all, a wider cir=
cle
of readers in Hungary gained access to those classic works (Marx, 1953 a=
nd
1963) which provided a theoretical-methodological groundwork to transcend =
the
antagonistic approaches of Naturwissenschaft (sciences of nature) versus
Geisteswissenschaft (sciences of the mind) which had provoked a scienti=
fic
cleavage. Marx surmounted the problem by taking production, instead of =
nature
or mind, as his starting point (Lukacs, 1973), production being just as much
determined by spatio-temporal dimensions as nature, and just as creative as
mind. Had i=
t not been
for such an integrative principle, the humanities could not have progresse=
d, despite
both the desire for integration and the need to solve current practical pr=
oblems.
Rather, such attempts would have remained trapped within the traditional b=
oundaries
of "Naturwissenschaft" or "Geisteswissenschaft", an=
d would
have been constrained forever to attempts to derive culture from human na=
ture,
or to trace everyday behavioral patterns back to man's mind. This would =
have
perpetuated the split between "explanatory" and "descripti=
ve"
human sciences. Thus =
in the I960s,
when the need was more clearly felt in Hungarian society for the developme=
nt "in
Marxist terms" of various branches of the humanities, including psycho=
logy,
it became more and more apparent that this need was identicat with the one=
that
urged psychology to make its findings available for integration by other d=
isciplines,
while itself developing the capacity to integrate research results from =
other
disciplines. The fact that there was a real need=
for a
Marxian psychology, i. e. for a psychology capable of integration with the
other humanities, is best demonstrated by the fact that there were
representatives of other fields who attempted to anticipate the development=
of
such a psychology as long as none had yet been elaborated (cf. e.g. Lukacs,
1963, vol. 2, Chapter 11). However, the elaboration of a Marxi=
st
psychology could have of fered psychology much more than the mere possibili=
ty
of integration with the rest of the humanities. Psychology is in a unique
position, for the "bisecting line" of the humanities cuts across
psychology and divides it into a "scientific"
(`Naturwissenschaft") and a "humanistic" ("Geisteswisse=
nschaft")
part, i.e. an "explanatory" and a "descriptive" psychol=
ogy,
the integration of which is in itself a longstanding problem. Now, Marx's
anthropological approach, which surpasses the two antagonistic approaches b=
y stressing
the principle of production, is especially promising in view of curing
psychology"s innate schizophrenia. To achieve integration, however, it=
will
not suffice merely to add Marxian theses on the one hand, and psychological
facts and interpretations on the other. In order to obtain a real degree of
integration, the non-psychological, production-centered conceptual framework
must be translated into terms appropriate for use in psychology. These new
conceptual tools can then be used to interpret the available data and facts=
as
well as to orientate further research. Such was precisely the research str=
ategy of
the Vygotsky school which had its renaissance in the 1960s. It exercised a
direct influence on the early phase of the work at the Department of
Personality Psychology. Vygotsky"s basic argument was that man in his
activity utilizes as psychic tools signs that are psychic products of his
previous activity. These signs constitute a special i.e. psychic category o=
f "means
of production" i.e. they are means which have been derived as a produc=
t of
production. Later, especially during the decade of the school's renaissance,
Vygotsky's colleagues (Leontiev, Galperin, Luriya, Elkonin and others) exte=
nded
their investigations from the sector of human activity producing and using
psychic signs to the whole of activity oriented to real objects and made the
general proposition that the phylogenesis and the ontogenesis of psychism t=
ake
place in object-oriented activity (Leontiev,1969). However, the theory that was built =
around
this general thésis contained a contradiction concerning the genesis of
motivation. A motive was understood as an originally inner need objectified=
in some
outer object, while the term object-oriented activity referred to a life
process directed towards such a motivating object. But where then does a mo=
tive
itself take its origin? It cannot be from activity itself since the latter,
according to the theory, would already presuppose the existence of some mot=
ive.
Hence if it is correct to argue that activity is organized by an originally
inner need objectified as a motive, then there must be aÌ least one
psychic factor which cannot originate in object-oriented activity. It is this theoretical contradictio=
n which
the hypothesis of the specifically human fundamental need has been posited=
to
resolvc, adopting the Marxian strategy of drawing on a productioncentered
conceptual framework (Garai, 1962a, b, c; 1966a, b; 1%9b; Eros and Garai,
1974). According to this hypothesis, a need, on either the human or the sub=
human
level, does not have to become objectified as motive in order to be able to
organize an activity, since a need through the process of phylogenesis dev=
elops
from the beginning as a need for object-oriented activity, evolving from t=
hose
purely inner biological tendencies already given at the level of cells and
directed towards the functions of nutrition, reproduction, the regeneratio=
n of
injured living structurc and the isolation of intruding alien materials. Th=
is
means that a need manifests itself as drive, inhibition, reward or punishme=
nt
in various phases of such an object-oriented activity that has its structure
determined according to the prevalent features of the given stage of
phylogenesis (Garai, 1968, 1969b, pp. 119-134, and 160-168; Garai and
Köcski,1975). Thus, the human character of a fund=
amental
need is determined by the structure of activity specific to the human level=
of phylogenesis.
The activity characteristic of the human species is work activity. The
hypothesis of the specifically human fundamental need suggests that man, as=
a
result of his phylogenetic development and an ontogenetic process of
maturation, possesses a need for some kind of activity, composed on the mod=
el
of the structure of work activity, that is, consisting of the following pha=
ses:
(1) appropriation: turning products of others" past activities into me=
ans for
the individual"s future activity; (2) setting á new goal, which is an
elaboration of tensions that appear between the already appropriated object=
s;
(3) attaining the goal by producing some new object not existing previously;
(4) alienation: a process that presents the product of the individual as a
means to be used by others in their future activities (Garai, 1969b, pp.
178-200). This hypothesis in itself presented=
a
possibility of synthetizing various, sometimes contradictory psychological
theories of motivation. For example, Lewin states that when a person has ma=
de a
decision, the resulting intention will become a quasi-need for him and will
maintain an inner tension until the decision has been carried out, regardle=
ss
of whether it is kept in the focus of con sciousnes=
s or not.
Freud, on the other hand, speaks of "forgetting" certain intentio=
ns,
i.e. purposefully expunging them from consciousness. Now, the hypothesis of=
the
speeifically human fundamental need explains that intentional actions have
their speciaI ways of fitting into man's activity structure, and the fact o=
f whether
this adaptation happens to take place in a goal-futfilling phase, or, on the
contrary, in an alienating phase will determine whether the intention works
according to Lewin's or to Freud's scheme. The hypothesis characterizes cer=
tain
(mental) tactics, which were in part discovered empirically by
social-psychological investigationsof cognitive dissonance and in part by
clinical psychoanalytical study of defense mechanisms, as fictitious manife=
stations
of the specifically human need. However, at this point of the devel=
opment
of the theory it became clear that such a level of abstraction overlooked a
very important aspect of motivation. In our approach, the existence of a
specifically human need was taken for granted as an anthropological fact, =
one
which motivates every normal individual to perform the successive phases of
activity discussed above, with no more variation than permitted by the giv=
en
stage of ontogenesis (Garai,1969b, pp.134-142). However, it is often found
that there is a considerable variation in the way in which certain social
expectations, concerning one phase or another, are met by different indiv=
iduals.
Some may feel that the activity which conforms to expectations is incited by
their own inner motivation, whereas others regard the same activity as the
result of some external pressure. There are some whose inner attitude
corresponds to external expectations, yet the attitude does not become a mo=
tive
of b_ehaviour; finally, some do not at all, either in thought or in action,=
fulfill
the given expectations. Variation is even greater when the
activities in question are not regulated by any explicit or implicit social
expectations. Some people make scientific discoveries or produce technical
inventions, others create works of art or lead a life that elevates them to
acts of great moral value. They may attract followers who develop the disco=
very
into a scientific school, the invention into an industrial enterprise, the =
work
of art into culture, and the individual moraI deed into a mass movement. So=
me
will still be found who retain their passive attitude towards historical
processes until a social expectation becomes clearly formulated. How is this variation to be explain=
ed? lt
could seem natural to resort to a typological analysis to answer this ques=
tion
addressed to personality psychology. However, the approach which was adop=
ted
for the research program of the Department of Personality Psychology was e=
ssentially
different. The methodological principle which led to rejecting the typolog=
ical
approach was found in Lewin (1935, pp. 41-90), who maintains that the mode=
rn,
Galilean mode of thinking requires psychology to refrain from sorting the
objects studied into different classes in which they would fall under diffe=
rent
laws. The typological approach in psychology is a remnant of this abneg=
ated
“Aristotelian” way of thinking, which, in order to cover phenomena that are
beyond the reach of the general psychological laws, designs other,
independent laws instead of homogenizing “with respect to the validity =
of
law” the world psychology investigates. An important point to add to Lewin's
concept of homogenization was elaborated within the framework of the
specifically human need hypothesis: individual motives and social determin=
ants
were not opposed to each other as biological needs to be described by natur=
al
laws, and cultural norms to be described by laws of the mind. One pole, the
need of the individual, was represented as directed towards an activity mod=
eled
after the structure of work, while the other pole, the social determinant, =
was
shown as a tension in the historical process of production (Garai, 1969b, p=
p.
81-111). Work =
and production
are two aspects, one individual and one social, of the same process. The s=
ame homogenization
principle was also applied to the above-mentioned problem of variation, an=
d resulted
in the interpretation that the different responses of different individu=
als to
the tensions arising in the historical process of production depended on t=
he positions
occupied in the total social structure of the relations of production. The specifically human need hypothe=
sis made
just such a statement of this interconnection. The task of a Marxist
psychology to render the production-centered conceptual framework adaptabl=
e was
not carried further by means of this approach than to where the fundamen=
tal
theoretical work of the Vygotsky school extended. Its work was in fact limi=
ted
to the aspect of production as work activity and left the problems of prod=
uction
as a relation of property unexplored. While expounding the specifically h=
uman
need hypothesis, the related contiadiction of the theory can only be mentio=
ned
(cf. Garai b,1969). Since =
the
question here concerned the mediation between social determinants and
individual motives, a Marxist and therefore production-centered psychologic=
al
investigation of human motivation could not be carried further unless the
verbally stated intereonnection was also made conceptually adaptable for ps=
ychological
purposes. The fi=
rst period
of work was by necessity characterized by a broad range of extensive inquir=
y.
This also followed from the deliberate way of organizing the team so as to
include representatives of dif ferent areas of psychology, namely theoretic=
al
psychology (Garai, 1969a), developmentaly psychology (Járó, 1973, 1975a, b,=
c,
d; Járó et al.,1975), social psychology (Garai,1969b), psychology of art
(ErBs,1972,1973), and neuro-psychology (Keleti,1970; Köcski, 1969a, 1969b, =
1971,
1972, 1974). The advantage of this composition was that the members of the =
team
could combine their diverse stocks of knowledge in the study of the complex
problematic of personality. The or=
ientation
of the team started with seminars on readings of the literature in personal=
ity
psychology in the strict sense. The typological approach being excluded f=
rom the
team"s range of interest for reasons presented above, attention was
concentrated on dynamic theories of personality. The major part of
Lewin"s field theory and the following two of Freud"s propositio=
ns
were integrated into the team"s principles of approach: (1) All the
psychic and somatic manifestations of the individual should be taken as s=
ymbols
and decoded with reference to the positions occupied in a system of
relationships (which in Freud is the Oedipal triangle; see Garai and
Köcski,1978, Köcski and Garai,1978); (2) Development is not something that
merely happens to the individual, but a process to which the personality
allocates much of its motivational energies either in an attempt to promot=
e or
to hinder that process in order to break up ot preserve the actual relatio=
nship
structures. The ne=
xt phase in
elaborating fundamentals was dominated by efforts to select a certain body =
of material
from social psychology that could be integrated into personality psychology=
. As
a consequence òf Garai's study visit to France in 1971 and his parti=
cipation Besides surveying different branche=
s of
psychology, the Department examined other approaches whicjZ could be integr=
ated
into a theory of personality psychology. Though this study was meant to con=
centrate
the multifarious research orientations, it in fact extended the field of
inquiry to areas outside psychology. Work w=
as
directed first to embrace the approach of philosophical anthropology and o=
ther
philosophical domains that had implications for the study of personality. An
important point to add to the views of the Department was found in
Sève's conception (1969) suggesting that the activity of personali=
ty
depends on extrinsic motivation that can only be understood by virtue of
those spatial and mainly temporal structures that are determined by the
existing relationships of production. (For a critical analysis of
Sève's book, see Erœs,1972). Studying Marx's Grundrisse and e=
xpounding
its psychological implications resulted in the construction of a produc=
tion-centered
psychology of personality which was initially elaborated in
economic-philosophical categories only. An examination of Kant's thought=
s in
the Critique ofpractica! reason led to an investigation of the 1ogical
patterns that organize the cognitions rationalizing a person's decisio=
ns.
This work eventually led to awareness of the categorization paradox (Garai,
1976b). In th=
e search
for theoretical synthesis, the Department examined the possibilities offere=
d by
mathematical systems theory. Attention was focused on the structure that
characterizes the systems studied by this theory as opposed to that of
cybernetic systems. These mathematical systems turned out to have special f=
ormal These "meta-scientific" s=
tudies
also had a direct bearing on one important area of the problematic which the
Department was going to explore. It was postulated that in the objective pr=
ocess
of the development of productive forces there emerge certain tasks which ar=
e in
the spirit of the time with no one in particular being responsible for havi=
ng
formulated them; and these tasks, mediated by the specifically human
fundamental need, have a motivating impact on persons occupying certain
positions in the social structure. The hypothesis was put forward, together
with an attempt to demonstrate it, in a paper analyzing János Bólyai"s
discovery of non-Euclidean geometry (Garai,1970). This paper, presented at =
the 13th
International Congress on the History of Science, argued for the hypothesis=
by
analyzing a remarkable fact: the two thousand year old geometrical problem =
had
been solved at the beginning of the l9th century simultaneously but indepen=
dently
by the Hungarian mathematician J. Bólyai and the Russian mathematician
Lobatchevski. Experimental work, started in 1971,=
was
based on the theoreticalrñethodological team work presented above. At
thát time the underlying assumptions of the production-centered psychology =
of personality
were as follows: 1) Develo=
pment of
personality takes place in the course of a process during which the person
retains or changes his place in a social structure. Retaining or changing p=
lace
does not happen gradually but passes through conflicts arising from time to
time, obliging the person to make clear-cut decisions for either conservati=
on
or change. 2) Develo=
pment of
personality is an integral part of the process of historical progress where=
the
social structure mentioned in paragraph (1) is either preserved or subjecte=
d to
change. The conservation or change of the social structure is not gradual: =
it
occurs in social crises in which clear-cut decisions are made for the
conservation or revolutionary change of the structure. 3) Preser=
vation or
change of the individual"s place within the social structure is not a =
mere
result of external social intervention to move or maintain the individual. A
person is motivated to change or retain his place by the specifically human
fundamental need which is essentially a need for development. But this
development itself is mediated by the series of acts of retaining or changi=
ng
place within the social structure. 4) Conser=
vation or
change of the structure of society is not an outcome of what certain groups=
of
individuals happen to want: it occurs by historical necessity, independent =
of
any person"s will. It is a necessity of economic nature which depends =
on
the production of the means of production. In certain historical periods it=
is
served by the conservation of the structure of the relations of production =
whereas
in other periods by a radical change in those relations. 5) The pr=
ocess of
development of personality and that of social progress are interconnected. =
When
the individual decides whether he is to.preserve or to change his place in =
the
social structure, this is at the same time a contribution to deciding wheth=
er
the social structure should change or remain the same. Also, when historica=
l events
give rise to either stability or changes in the social structure, the posit=
ions
that may be taken in it will stabilize or change accordingly. 6) The decisi=
on
which in a given period a person makes concerning the question, arising in =
an
historical context, of preserving or changing the social structure, is
determined by that person"s position in the social structure in questi=
on
i.e. his class position. The basic assumption for the experi=
ments
was that the selfdevelopment of the personality through erises and decision=
s can
begrasped by analyzing behavior in conflict situations of decision. Analysis was centred on two aspects=
of decision-making
behavior: (1) What is it that the decision evokes or inhibits the memory o=
f from
among whatever has been stored and arranged into structures in memory thr=
oughout
life? (2) What kind of a permanent mark does the decision produce, which m=
ay then
prove decisive for the rest of the person's life? As regards the first of these quest=
ions,
experiments were conducted by Garai (1969a) with undergraduate students in =
In another experiment, high school =
pupils
were given a passage of surrealist prose, that is the kind of literature in
which the sentences are not connected to one another to form a story or a l=
ogical
train of thought but seem to follow loosely, "making no sense", b=
ut
still somehow holding together. The different groups were asked to retell t=
he
passage after havmg made various evaluative decisions concerning the téxt.
These experiments reinforced the presupposition that recalling hidden
structures of a text was markedly affected by the kind of value dimension —
beautiful/ugly, tragic/idyllic, comic/elegiac or sublime/base — along which=
the
decision was made. For the second aspect of decision-m=
aking behavior,
mentioned above, the presupposition was that the specifically human fundam=
ental
need becomes a motive by virtue of a decision alone. That is, choice is not=
determined
by previously existing preferences and aversions but, on the contrary, the =
direction
of the choice determin=3D ed by the fundamental need will shape the prefe=
rences
and aversions which then consistently determine further activities. Since =
such
a hypothesis finds ample support in the rich fund of empirical evidence ga=
thered
through experiments in the theory of cognitive dissonance, the Department =
did not
look for renewed experimental proof of the existence of such an inverse re=
lationship.
Instead, the attempt was made to specify whether the relationship itself =
could
be considered as a specifically human characteristic and to what extent=
it was
justified to suppose that the relationship was present throughout phylogene=
sis but
at the human level appeared with essential=
ly
different qualitative features. In order to settle this question, t=
he
members of the Department designed an experiment. It was expected that by
observing the behavior of animals in a maze with one single crossing point,
they could see if the first (random) choice at the crossing determined later
preferences of direction or not. However, after the preparatory experiments=
to
check various conditions of reinforcement, the work had to be suspended due=
to
lack of suitable equipment. After a relatively long time an
experimental methodology using a modification of the game "Monopoly&qu=
ot;
was finally set forth as a tool of an essentially production-centered
psychological approach to the problem of decision. The game itself was unkn=
own
to the subjects, high school pupils, and the only modification was the
insertion in the instructions, comprising the smallest possible number of f=
ormal
rules, of one saying that among the four subjects playing at one time the
leader "plays as he likes while the rest should all play accordingly a=
nd
consistently". The instructions identified the leader according to a
criterion dependent on the progress of the game, and it characterized a pla=
yer
for a period of several steps. (The designation "leader" was not
used). The steps in the first part of the game involve certain decisions
simulating economic activities purchasing sites, building houses, etc. In t=
he experiment,
according to the instructions, the "leader" had the privilege of
deciding what he was going to buy and on what terms. His power was limited =
only
by the instruction to be "consistent", while the rest of the
players" power depended on how they interpreted the deliberately vague
instruction to play "according to what the leader does". All subj=
ects
had to give reasons for each of their decisions. The experiment was designed to mode=
l the
rationalization of decisions and to use the model in exploring to what exte=
nt
it depends on the position of who decides, and on the actual phase of the g=
ame,
whether the rationalization concerns this position and phase only or is cla=
imed
to cover all positions and the whole of the game. After testing in 1973, the
method was ready for application. By 1973, the Department of Personal=
ity
Psychology had completed the process of formulating its theoretical assumpt=
ions
and methodological ideas. Paradoxically, this resulted in a state of crisis=
. Garai's visit to The objection proved justifiable on=
the
basis of the argument that follows. The totality-oriented assumptions of the
theory are related to the question of whether a kind of social structure sh=
ould
survive or not, whereas the experimental method, by the very requirement of
repeatability of the experiment, implies an a priori decision in favour of =
the
survival of this structure (cf. Adorno et al, 1976) and it represents this
pre-experimental, extra-scientific, ideological procedure as if it had beco=
me
scientifcally verified by the experiment-. The Department had to face a dilemm=
a: (1)
Either one could go on with the further elaboration of a production-centere=
d psychology
which originally had been developed in order to answer the questions raised=
by
the social praxis of the sixties. Such a psychological. theory, however, ca=
nnot
apply the traditional procedures of scientific verification but is, instead,
obliged to find the justification of its approach in the social praxis of t=
he
seventies; (2) Or, one could return to purely psychological theories, geare=
d to
traditional procedures of verification. During his stay in In the light of this conelusion, the
Department was faced by the alternative of either carrying on with the prod=
uction-centered
study of needs, thus giving up all expectations of psychological verifica-t=
ion,
or having recourse to purely psychological procedures, thus abandoning any
illusion of apprehending the phenomena of needs and motivation. In order to understand this grave s=
ituation
better, it should be mentioned that the very reason for setting up the
Department at the In the first part of the crisis pér=
iod, the
activities at the Department bifurcated. One group investigated the
possibilities of nonexperimental methods (questionnaires, sociometry) of pu=
re
and applied psychology. Another group examined ways of coneeptualizing in p=
ure
psychology in order to see which of the phenomena tackled in the period pri=
or
to the crisis (conflict, decision, cationalization, personal memory, etc.)
could be deseribed by these means. This period of work was characteriz=
ed by
mutual hostility and repeated exehange of derogatory opinions. Indeed, what
happened at that time was that the points of identity and of difference in
opinion which had always existed among the members of the Department became
sharpened by the crisis and, losing all nuances were elaborated into downri=
ght,
categorical identities or categorical differences. When, in seareh of new
possibilities of conceptualization, the members eventually considered the u=
ses
to which the concept of social categorization might be put, this concept tu=
rned
out to be suitable first, in a purely psychological non-production-centered
approach for deseribing other crisis situations analogous to that within the
Department. Following this discovery, "social categorization" bec=
ame
the central term of conceptualization. Naturally, the concept underwent so=
me
modification of meaning in comparison to the way it has been used, following
Tajfel, in the social psychological literature (cf. Garai, 1976). The most
important difference was that the Department"s works also contained re=
ference
to the type of social categorization which does not presuppose the conscious
activity of the self since, on the contrary, it is even a precondition for =
the
development of the consciously act- In both cases categorization is med=
iated by
some kind of signalization. Along with a category forming within the
population, or a narrow category within the broader one, there appears a=
set
of signals (motor, vocal, postural, secretory, vaso-motor, pigmentary or
still others) which signifies that the individual belongs to the category=
in
question (cf. Köcski and Garai,1975). Complementing the methods of develo=
pmental
psychology (Járó,1975a), in which she had displayed such great expertise, =
Járó
(1973), with the assistance of Veres, elaborated complex methods, combining
various social psychological techniques, for use in field investigations
related to the development of social abilities on thc one hand, and to the
social factors of psychic development on the other. These methods seemed
suitable for an initial approachnot production-centred, but purely
psychological to the type of phenomena that had been in the foreground of t=
he
Department"s interest in the earlier period. It was in an atmosphere of prolonge=
d crisis
that the preparations for the European Conference on Social Psychology in 1=
974
at Visegrád were made.z Prior to the Conference, the Department had discuss=
ed
Garai"s and Erös" papers. As a contribution to the themc "The
social psychology of social change" which he had proposed placing on t=
he
agenda, Garai made an attempt to present thc production-centered theory und=
er
the tital "Is Social changc motivated?" (Garai, 1974). The subject
chosen by Erós was a characteristic expression of the fundamental problem of
thc Department, an interior problem, but one which all humanistic studies
starting in the sixties and continuing in the seventieshad to face: what are
critical qúestions about society destined to become, once they are integrat=
ed
in social research based on thc methodological groundwork of "abstract
empiricism" and "middle range theory". (See Erös, 1974, who
illustrates this point in an analysis of The
authoritarian personality). According to one of the assumptions=
of the
production-centered theory of personality (see above), social formations ma=
ke
progress through crises, in the course of which person·ality also develops.=
At the lowest ebb of its crisis, the
Department of Personality Psychology might have realized (which it did not,
however, since this kind of realization is apt to take place only
retrospectively) that it had made some progress in a purely psychological
conceptualization social categorization and categorizational signification =
and
in elaborating a purely psychological method, combining developmental and
social psychological methods. The crisis had not come to an end, =
however,
as became explicit during the periodic thematic discussions held in the
Department: none of the members wished to give up motivation research, nor =
to put
up with the professional-ideological illusions which a purely psychological
research on motivations would have imposed upon them. The production-centered theory of
personality considered the motivated development of personality in its rela=
tion
to crisis and revolutionary transformations of social totality. At the same
timc, the Department involved in a crisis of its own microsocial formation,
undertook its transformation in a way which resulted in development. While
running the field investigations which had been launched at that time (see
below), the Department members were also confronted by microsocial forms in
which as a rule they found that, if their accumulating crisis failed to eru=
pt,
development of the personality might stagnate or that an evolving but prolo=
nged
crisis might lead to self-destruction and ultimately to suicide, while the
resolution of the crisis could bring about the development of the personali=
ty.
It was thus with reference to microsocial forms that a hypothesis was set f=
orth
suggesting that the realization of these possibilities did not depend on wh=
at
typological characteristics mediate as "inner conditions" the
external effect of the "social environment" in a given person. The
earlier conception was that the mediating positiòn was that "he=
ld
by the person in the global social structure of the relations of
production", in particular, with respect to belonging to the class of =
the
propertied or the propertyless. It was vital for the prospects of a
productioncentered study of personality that microsocial forms and the pro-=
The model, whose possible applicati=
on to
microsocial relationships is being examined, shows the following relations=
hip,
revealed by Marx's production-centered philosophy of history historical mat=
erialism:
possession of certain means of production ensures certain positions in the
global social structure, positions permitting ruling this structure by pol=
itical
and ideological means; the aim of such a rule is essentially to maintain =
the
very structure in which precisely the possession of the means of productio=
n is
what reinforces the dominant position. This is a paradoxical formation, wh=
ose
principle of organization is determined by those who occupy dominant posit=
ions
and who in turn are determined to occupy dominant positions by the principl=
e of
organization itself. An investigation into the question of whether such p=
aradoxical
formations are to be found in microsocial relationshisp as well leads at fi=
rst
to the result that there are only paradoxical formations since this princi=
ple
of organization proves in a first analysis to be that which serves to perfo=
rm
social categorizations which, then, is characterized by the categorization
paradox (Garai, 1976b; 1977a; Erœs and Garai, 1978). This is so becau=
se
the subject who performs the categorization belongs to the object he
categorizes, and at the same time is only detached from it as a result of t=
his categorization
(as "we" or "I"). After closer investigation, it turn=
ed out that
within all formations (groups, roles) which in social psychology have trad=
itionally
been regarded as possessing their given principles of organization, indepe=
ndently
of the persons composing them, a dominant position exists which in fact de=
termines
the principles of organization. Thus, for example; the principle of organ=
ization
of a role relationship like that between doctor and patient is determined=
from
the position of the doctor: it is always here that is decided what the cri=
teria
are for being doctor or patient (Garai, 1975). The perspectives of the motivated
development of the personality are mediated by the position a person occupi=
es
in the structure analyzed by the paradigm of property relations during the
given historical phase (consolidated, pre-crisis, in crisis, or consolidati=
ng after
crisis) of the microsoeial formation (Járó, 1975a; Járó and Veres, 1976a and
1976b). The possibilities offered by å
paradigmatic approach to the relations of property resolved the dilemma of =
a "production-centered, approach" vs. "concrete research" and also the =
crisis
that stemmed from it. Thus came to an end the period in t=
he work
of the Department of Personality Psychology during which its prineipal task
had been to promote the assimilation of the non (or ñot mainly)
psychological set of production-centered concepts into psychology. This ef=
fort
had specifically concerned the problem areas not tackled by the Vygotsky
school. . Within the framework of the Departm=
ent,
Járó, Keleti, Köcski and Veres have mainly been engaged in empirieal case
investigations. They have made it possible to serutinize systematically, and
trace back to actual psychological phenomena, the abstract statements of the
produetion-centered psychology of personality by making use, on the one han=
d,
of the new features and conceptual tools of the theory (such as social
categorization, the paradigm of property relations, self-qualifying paradox=
es)
and, on the other, by applying the methodological results and the experience
gained in earlier empirical researeh, mostly in sehools (Járó and Veres,
1976a). As a matter of fact, the goal set for empirical researeh had been, =
even
previously, more comprehensive than simply planning and elaborating suitable
technical-methodological devices. In order that the theory concentrating on=
the
laws of development could ultimately apply to any person and under the
circumstances of any social formation, empirical researeh set as a goal to
delineate the area of validity and to specify the need for supplementary
conceptualization with respect to the phenomena outside that area. The investigations made by this gro=
up are
connected by a set of hypotheses concerning the conerete social and
ìndividual criteria of the development of personality. Each of them
focuses on different aspects and periods of development and reflects upon t=
he
generally formulated question: What are the conditions and events that perm=
it
us to state that a person develops? The members of the group made a cre=
ative
attempt to answer the question by a joint application of the principles of
production-centered psychology so that they could refer to conerete individ=
uals
chosen as subjects. The starting point for their analysis was that accordi=
ng
to the hypothesis of the specifically human fundamental need, the motivati=
on
for development the need for setting a goal is held to be valid for every
individual under certain social conditions, this motivation being a
supraindividual and extrapsychic factor. It was also postulated that the
conditions of the force of the motivation can be described with the help of=
the
property relations paradigm. Within the various social formations, one of t=
hese
objective conditions is the position from which the goal of the common acti=
vity
can be determined, and the other is the nature of the historical period, wh=
ich
determines whether the goal is set from the dominant position (stabilizatio=
n)
or whether there is a chance to determine the goals for the forces of the n=
ew
order, formerly in a position of dependence (revolution). The theoretical conclusion reached =
at this
point by the empirical research group was that personality development is n=
ot a
general human process one of anthropological validity but is attained exclu=
sively
by those holding the positions which, at the time of the investigation, bear
the historically mature tendencies of development. From this it follows that
the objective factors making the development of the personality possible ca=
n be
shown by analyzing the historical movement of the social formation providing
the · framework of development, and the positions held within it. The social categorization hypothesi=
s is
concerned with the subjective conditions of the development of personalit=
y.
This hypothesis is not only an attempt to answer the philosophical question=
of
how it is possible for man to experience as his own subjective free will wh=
at
in fact is objectively, i.e. economically, necessary. At the same time it
offers a theoretical possibility to investigate psychologically how a perso=
n in
his concrete historicalsocial situation makes his decision concerning the
alternatives of development emerging before him. The hypothesis also provides the ba=
sis for
a description of the semiotic devices and processes through which the person
carries out his decision with reference to himself and to his environment.
Decisions with respect to categorization may either stabilize the social sy=
stem
or provoke a crisis within it according to the concrete historical situation
and the position occupied in the system of relationships. The above ideas have been developed=
by
Járó, thus summarizing the principles of a production-centered psychology i=
n a
unified The production-centered model of
ontogenesis necessarily had to face the criteria and range also of phenomen=
a of
"nondevelopment" while describing the periods of development and =
systems
of relationships in the social forms serving as frames for ontogenesis
dependence relations in stable periods and of the inner mechanism of
personality (rationalization) (Járó, 1975a; Járó and Veres, 1976b). The various empirical case studies =
under way
in the Department permit analysis of different aspects of social categoriz=
ation
among the social formations actually canalizing development, thus bringing =
different
stages of ontogenesis under investigation. The following themes are addres=
sed: 1) Emerge=
nce of
categorial signalization in the early phase of ontogenesis, in the course =
of
the differentiation of "I" and "others" (Köcski, 1976,
1977; Garai and Köcski, 1976, I978; Köcski and Garai,1978). 2) Positi=
onal
differences in the categorization of high-school pupils occupying various
positions in the system of relationships within the class (Járó and Veres,
1975; Veres, Járó and Erós, 1975a; Járó and Veres,1976a,1976b; Veres,1976a)=
. 3) Catego=
rizational
mediation of the change of social stratum in young workers coming to town f=
rom
the country. Possibilities for intluencing the categorization by cultural m=
eans
(Veres, 1975, 1976,1977a,1977b). 4) Defici=
ent social
and generational categorization as a cause of suicide in the period of grow=
ing
up (Keleti,1976a,1976b). Work on these themes has, of course,
attained different levels of conceptualization and of exploration of facts.
Currently, all the investigations conducted by members of this group are ca=
se
studies or structurally oriented field research since earlier attempts at
experiments failed and were abandoned. Empirical work within the
production-centered-psychological approach, whether carried out by recording
observations in life Recent field studies have used a
production-centered psychological approach, not only as a device of cogniti=
on
but of social praxis as well: our studies in a high sehool and in a
workers" hostel introduced the method of social psychological and pers=
onality-psychological
"catalysis" aiming at establishing the groups" self-reflecti=
on. 2. Theoretical-rnethodological rese=
areh Part of the work in the Department =
is done
by independent methods of theory construction and methodologicat eritique o=
f theories,
w-hich is a type of tool that has also appeared in other sciences (physics,
biology) at a given stage of their development. The aim of this work is to develop a
personality psychology independent of general psychology· (cf. Garai, 1968;
1969b, pp. 142-164; 1970). The task falls into two phases: (1) integrating =
the
individual psychological (from psychoanalysis, developmental psychology,
persoñality dynamics) with the social psychologieal stock of facts a=
nd
interpretive materials that refer to personality; (2)establishing a synthes=
is
of this independent personality psychology and general psychology. In both
phases Lewin"s principle of homogenization (see above) is instrumental=
. Work
in the first of these phases is more advanced. The validity of some social
psychological theories was tested and a synthesis of the theory of cognitive
dissonance and that of social categorization has been arrived at (Garai, 19=
77a:
1977c; 1977d; Erös and Garai, 1978). As a result of the examination of the
social psychological theory of conflicts and of the ideological critique
directed against it (see the Deutseh/Plon debate in the Euròpean Jou=
rnal
o J Socia! Psychology (1974), the conelusion was that one of the two partie=
s opposéd
in a conflict will determine the structural frames within which the conflict
can be "acted out", but the other party maydepending on the
historical state of the macroor the micro-social formation extend the confl=
ict
from the level connected with its object (object-level) to the level of the
structural framework that determines it (mzeta-level), positing his owvn
principles of organiza- In a paper belonging to the second =
phase of
this work, Garai (1978) showed that all attempts to understand the whole of
meñtal activity in terms of brain funetioning alone lead by necessit=
y to
leaving aside those phenomena which have their origin in social or personal=
ity
factors (such as, for example, the meaning of environmental "stimuli&q=
uot;).
At the same time, he pointed out that taking these phenomena into considera=
tion
leads to a sort of dualism. As a solution for this dilemma Garai suggested =
that
the territorial mechanisms of supraindividual organization, rather than bra=
in functioning,
be regarded as the prime meehanism of these phenomena. These theoretical activities were s=
upported
by a methodological critique of various social psychological and individual=
psychological
theories. It primarily consisted in criticizing the conceptions of society =
and
of personality implied by the different theories, within the framework of t=
he
history of ideas and of the critique of ideologies. The first systematic
attempt in this direction was made by Erðs in his previously mentioned
paper presented at the Visegrád conference (ErBs, 1974). In his later studi=
es
(1975, 1976a, 1976b, 1977a, 1977b; see also Garai and Erös, 1976; Erós and
Garai, 1978) he further developed this type of analysis, also making use of=
the
complex historical material that he had collected during his stay in the Un=
ited
States (1976). One cr=
ucial
theme of the historicat and ideological-critical studies was the rise of
American social psychology and the process in its devélopment by which it
ceased to be a "social prophesy" commilted to reforms, and became=
a
sort of "social technology" a technique of mass manipulation (see
Erós,1977b; Erós and Garai, 1978). Anothe=
r central
question was related to critical social theory, born in the Europe of the
thirties and oriented towards an empirical social psychology, as seen
especially in the case of the FreudoMarxists (Reich, Fromm) and the theoris=
ts
of the Frankfurt Sehool (Adorno, Horkheimer). Two aspects of critical theory
are to be noted here. First, because they are good examples of the consiste=
nt critique
of the ideological preconceptions of psyehology as well as Some preliminary results of researc=
h in
progress in the Department of Personality Psychology were presented in 1977=
at
the session commemorating the 75th anniversary of the creation of the 1. The term, the humanities is
traditionally used in 2. Of the members of the Department=
, Garai
took part in the work of the International Organizing Committee of the
Conference, and Ergs participated in the preparatory work. Lines of orientation of
research
in the general meeting and conference of the European Association of Expe=
rimental
Social Psychology in 1972, the Department hecame acquainted with the theor=
etical
and methodological critique which Western European social psychologists =
were
applying to the American tradition of the discipline, as well as to their =
own pre-1968
work. This critique had a decisive influence on the views of the Departme=
nt (cf.
Garai, 1972c), due to a large extent to the eontrast with the background =
against
which it was perceived, namely that of a general lack of critique characte=
ristic
of social psychology in Hungary at that time. It was especially at the fir=
st Hungarian
Social Psychological Conference in 1972 that this cotltrast was quite clear=
ly noticed
by the Department, thus setting the tone of members" contributions to=
the
conference where their "harsh" opinions inevitably roused gener=
al objection
and resulted in their complete isolation.
mechanisms which, unlike cybernetic feedback and information, provide for d=
evelopment
and not for equilibrium in systems (Garai, 1971, 1973a). These mathematica=
l systems
turned out to have special formal mechanisms which, unlike cyberneúc feed=
back
and information, provide for development and not for equilibrium in syste=
ms (Garai,
1971, 1973a). In their search for synthesis, the Department members also tu=
rned
to philosophy of seience and examined the way in which other sciences, =
especially
physics and biology, had found the means to encourage processes of inte=
gration
during periods of crisis. Further, concrete investigations were made to =
find
out to what extent the different psychological theories, which are the mo=
st concerned
with personality can be fitted together into one logical system. This work=
in particular
and, in general the entire activity of the Department, was favourably inf=
luenced
by a Marxist group of French psychologists (Pécheux, Plon, Poitou and other=
s) whose
critique of social psychology is based on Lacan's version of psychoanalysi=
s.Experimental designs
Crisis and social categorization
various abilities and even with developing them, these disciplines are not
competent in questions of needs.
ing self (Köcski,1976). Consequently, social categorization is also recogni=
zable
at the sub-human level, mainly in the way certain individuals of a species
occupy a part of the living space as their owñ territory and keep ot=
hers
of the same species away. It is considered to be a higher-order manifest=
ation
of social categorization when, within the category thus established, a
structure develops in the assemblage in which a given position, e.g. that =
of
flock leader, is steadily occupied by one individual to the exclusion of all
others. The paradigm of the relations of property
cesses that take place within them should be deseribable by the paradigm of
relations of property.2 Researeh in progress
1. Empirical and case studi=
es
model of development (Járó, 1975a). The central concept of the model is the
episode of self-definition, which can either take in the historical moment =
in
which the alternative of development appears or the structure of the social
system of relationships (the dominant, mediating, dependent; and marginal
positions). The episode of self definition is a historically and postionally
structured situation of ehoice which will serve as a frame of reference for
interpreting decisions about categorization (Járó and Veres, 1976a).
situations as in a diary, or by interviews, questionnaires or unfinished
stories, is always so designed as to isolate the episodes of self-definition
from the natural flow of complex events, and to allow positional and semiot=
ic
analyses by comparing the signs used by the persons with the objective
structure of the situation.
tion in opposition to the principle of organization fixed in the existing
structure. Through the extension of the conflict to two levels, the formati=
on
enters a crisis for which only a radical solution is possible (Garai and
Erœs,1976; Garai,1977).
of the social sciences in general (see Adorno et al, I976, especially Adorn=
o"s
writings), and second, because they demonstrate that the ideas of critical
theory are themselves not free from certain lapses into ideological functio=
ns.
This double aspect is best revealed in Adorno"s and his associates&quo=
t;
work, The Authoriturianpersonality, which is in some respects critical
theorists" greatest achievement in social psychology. Nonetheless, the
implicit contradictions of this work have furnished possibilities for its
"positivist reinterpretation" and in this way for its adaptation =
to
the main trends of American social psychology. (On the set of
coñtradictions in this work and the process of reinterpretation, see
Erœs,1977b).Notes
In 1970 there was organized in the
Institute for Psychology of the
The scientific program of the Depar=
tment
has its antecedents dating back to the 1960s. That period in
-----------------------=
------------------------------------------------------------------- =
No su=
ch body of
integrated knowledge really existed. But within the individual disciplines=
, separately
reawakening or even reviving in the 1960s, the necessity for an integration=
of
knowledge was felt in order to cope with the questions of that period.
Moreover, the possibility for an integration of knowledge existed. As conc=
erns
the humanities it emerged in the course of events which Lukacs called the
renaissance of Marxism. Through this process, first of all, a wider circle =
of
readers in Hungary gained access to those classic works (Marx, 1953 and 19=
63)
which provided a theoretical-methodological groundwork to transcend the
antagonistic approaches of Naturwissenschaft (sciences of nature) versus
Geisteswissensehaft (sciences of the mind) which had provoked a scientific
cleavage. Marx surmounted the problem by taking production, instead of =
nature
or mind, as his starting point
(Lukacs, 1973), production being ju=
st as
much determined by spatiotemporal dimensions as nature, and just as creativ=
e as
mind.
Had it not been for such an integra=
tive
principle, the humanities could not have progressed, despite both the desir=
e for
integration and the need to solve current practical problems. Rather, such
attempts would have remained trapped within the traditional boundaries of
Naturwissenschaft or Geisteswissenschaft, and would have been constrained
forever to attempts to derive cultu=
re
from human nature, or to trace =
everyday
behavioral patterns back to man's mind. This would have perpetuated the
split between explanatory and deseriptive human sciences.
-----------------------=
------------------------------------------------------------------- =
Such was precisely the research str=
ategy of
the Vygotsky school which had its renaissance in the 1960s. It exercised a
direct influence on the early phase of the work at the Department of
Personality Psychology. Vygotsky's basic argument was that man in his
activity utilizes as psychic tools signs that are psychic products of his
previous activity. These signs constitute a special (namely, psychic) categ=
ory
of means of production derived as a product of production. Later, especially
during the decade of the schools renaissance, Vygotsky's colleagues (Leonti=
ev,
Galperin, Luria, Elkonin and others) extended their investigations from the
sector of human activity producing and using psychic signs to the whole of
activity oriented to real objects and made the general proposition that the
phylogenesis and the ontogenesis of psychism take place in object-oriented
activity (Leontiev, 1969).
However, the theory that was built =
around
this general thesis contained a contradiction concerning the genesis of
motivation. A motive was understood as an
originally inner need objectified in some outer object, while the object-oriented activity was conce=
ived
as a life pcocess directed towards such a motivating object. But where =
then
does a motive itself take its origin? It cannot be from activity itself sin=
ce
the latter, according to the theory, would already presuppose the existence=
of
some motive. Hence if it is correct to argue that activity is organized by =
an
originally inner need objectified =
as a
motive, then there must be at least one psychic factor which cannot origina=
te
in object-oriented activity.
It is this theoretical contradictio=
n which
a hypothesis of the specifically h=
uman
fundamental need has been posited to resolve within a production-cente=
red
conceptual framework (Garai, 1962a, b, c; 1966a, b; 1969b; Eros and Garai,
1974). According to this hypothesis, a need is not an inner biological
tendency that would need to get objectified for getting efficency in orien=
ting
activity. Purely inner biological tendencies of nutrition, reproduction,
regeneration of injured living tissue and excretion of extraneous
materials are already given at the level of Protozoa. These inner tendencies
are not needs but represent a kind of proto-needs
that develops from the very beginning of the phylogenesis as a need for an object-oriented activity. It
manifests itself as drive, inhibition, reward or punishment in various phas=
es
of such an object-oriented activity that has its structure determined accor=
ding
to the prevalent features of the given stage of phylogenesis (Garai, 1968,
1969b, pp. 119-134, and 160-168; Garai and Kocski, 1975).
Thus, the specifically human character of a fundamental need is determine=
d by
the structure of activity specific to the human level of phylogenesis. The
activity characteristic of the human species is work activity. The hypothes=
is
of the specifically human fundamental need suggests that man, as a result of
his phylogenetic development and of an ontogenetic process of maturation,
possesses a need for some kind of activity, composed on the model of the
structure of work activity, that is, consisting of the following phases:
(1)
appropriation: turning products of others past activities into means for the
individuals future activity;
(2)
setting new goal, which is an elaboration of tensions that appear between t=
he
already appropriated objects;
(3)
attaining the goal by producing some new object not existing previously;
(4)
alienation: a process that presents the product of the individual as a mean=
s to
be used by others in their future activities (Garai, 1969b, pp. 178-200).
This hyp=
othesis in
itself presented a possibility of synthetizing various, sometimes contradi=
ctory
psychological theories of motivation. For example, Lewin states that when a
person has made a decision, the resulting intention will become a quasi-ne=
ed
for him and will maintain an inner tension until the decision has been car=
ried
out, regardless of whether it is kept in the focus of con
=
* The research group dealt with in this article was created in =
1970
at the
[1=
] The research group officially got the status of the Institute=
's
Department of Personality Psychology. Its staff in I978 includes László Ga=
rai,
Ph. D., Senior Research Associate,=
Head of the Department; Dr Ferenc
Garai et al<= /i>: Towards a social psychology of personality
Garai et al: Towards a social psychology of personality